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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BANK OF EPHRAIM,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 14514
vs.
HALBERT DAVIS, STEVIE KAY
STEINMANN, BABYLON CORPORATION,
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS, FIRST
STATE BANK, UTAH STATE TAX COMMIS- )
SION, and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
)

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND CROSS-APPELLANT,
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION

NATURE OF CASE
The Bank of Ephraim brought a foreclosure action
against Halbert Davis based on defaults upon notes secured
by mortgages upon two parcels of real property located in
Sanpete County, State of Utah, and against the other defendants, each having an interest of record upon the real property.

The defendants, other than Halbert Davis, made

counterclaims and crossclaims based upon notes secured by
instruments of record or liens of record.

Judgment was

awarded by the Sixth Judicial District Court to the Bank of
Ephraim, Babylon Corporation, Prudential Federal Savings &
Loan Association, and the Utah State Tax Commission.

The

Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure specified the amounts to
be paid the judgment creditors from the proceeds of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
foreclosure
sale
and the priority of payment.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent and cross-appellant Prudential Federal
Savings

&

Loan Association prays that the judgment be affirrne:

as to the priorities on parcels 1 and 2, hereafter the "cafe
property," that the Court reverse the trial court 1 s findings
of fact, conclusions of law and judgment insofar as the Bank
of Ephraim was awarded priority over Prudential Federal
Savings & Loan Association in excess of $4,000 on parcel 3,
hereafter the "trailer court property," and reverse as to
the award of attorney's fees of Prudential Federal Savings &
Loan Association, directing the trial court to award attarney' s fees consistent with the evidence and with the other
findings and conclusions of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prunential Federal Savings & Loan Association
(hereafter "Prudential"), agrees with the Statement of Facts
insofar as set forth in the appellant's brief.

However,

there are additional facts, primarily dealing with the recording order of the various mortgages, which are not stated
in appellant's brief, but are set forth below.

In addition,

this Statement of Facts includes a swnmary of the facts upor
1

which Prudential relies for its claim of attorney s fees.
The records of the Sanpete County Recorder r
·
the following mortgages as to the cafe property 1n
recordation:

ef!ect

°rder of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Halbert Davis to Bank of Ephraim, dated

August 7, 1970, recorded August 10, 1970, at Book 150,
page 413.

On the face of the mortgage, typed on the

printed standard form, appears the following language:
"This mortgage covers all additional advances on this
loan, the total principal amount not to exceed $3,000."
(2)

Halbert Davis to Steven Kay Steinmann, dated

August 7, 1970, recorded August 10, 1970, at Book 150,
page 419, assigned to Babylon Corporation on January 28,
1972, recorded January 28, 1972, at Book 163, page 194.
The mortgage secured indebtedness in the amount of
$14,500.
(3)

Halbert D. Davis to Prudential Federal Sav-

ings & Loan Association, dated June 1, 1972, recorded
June 22, 1972, at Book 165, page 750.

This installment

note and mortgage was to secure the amount of $4,073.40.
(4)

Halbert D. Davis to Prudential Federal Sav-

ings & Loan Association, dated October 16, 1972, recorded October 19, 1972, at Book 167, page 381.

This

installment note and mortgage secured indebtedness in
the sum of $10,228.80, which included the prior installment note and mortgage of $4,073.40 (R. 125-8).
The records of the Sanpete County Recorder reflect
the following mortgages as to the trailer court property, in
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
order Sponsored
of recordation:
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Halbert Davis to Bank of Ephraim, dated

March 15, 1971, recorded March 18, 1971, at Book 155,
page 534.

The mortgage stated that it secured indebted-

ness in the amount of $4,000 and contained a provision
typed on the face of the Bank's standard form as follows:
"This mortgage covers all additional advances on this
loan, the total principal amount not to exceed $6,000."
(2)

Halbert D. Davis to Prudential Federal Sav-

ings & Loan Association, dated June 21, 1972, recorded
June 22, 1972, at Book 165, page 750.

This installment

note and mortgage secured indebtedness in the sum of
$4,073.40.
(3)

Halbert D. Davis to Prudential Federal Sav-

ings & Loan Association, dated October 16, 1972, recorded October 19, 1972, at Book 167, page 381.

This

installment note and mortgage secured indebtedness in
the sum of $10,228.80, which included the prior installment note and mortgage of $4,073.40

(R. 125-8).

In addition to the foregoing, Halbert D. Davis
executed mortgages securing indebtedness to First State Bank
and several judgments appear of record, all subsequent to
the date of the mortgages listed above and not in issue at
trial or on appeal.
The Court awarded judgment and assigned the priSponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
Library.
Funding
for digitization
provided by
the Institute
of Museum and Libraryas
Services
orities
on Law
the
cafe
and
trailer
court
properties
set
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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forth in the brief of the appellant.

The attorneys for

Babylon Corporation, Prudential, Halbert Davis and the Bank
of Ephraim testified as to attorney's fees.

S. Rex Lewis,

attorney for Steven Steinmann and Babylon Corporation, upon
cross examination by Udell Jensen, attorney for Halbert
Davis, testified as follows:
Q

How many hours did you say you had spent?

A

Twenty, up until today's date.

Q

And is it your usual charge at the office about
thirty-five dollars per hour?

A

Fifty dollars.

Q

And so the balance for that request is based upon
the anticipation of service today and subsequent?

A

Additional time will be spent.

Q

And your figure for today if you charge today by
that same rate or by so much per day?

A

Yes.

Q

You charge two hundred dollars a day, is that what
your Court charge is?

A

We charge three hundred fifty dollars a day or
more.
It's usually more if we have to go out of
town.

Q

If you calculate it on the usual figures, you
would have approximately twenty-three hundred
dollars?

A

A strictly hourly basis, I will have, approximately 2,000.
(Tr., pp. 29-31.)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Wayne G. Petty, attorney for Prudential, testified as follows:
A

As to attorney's fees, the total time spent to
date on this matter is thirty-seven and a half
hours, certain costs have also been incurred in
this matter, twenty-five dollars title search,
travel expenses, copies of pleadings and so forth,
totaling a hundred and sixty-seven dollars.
THE COURT:
Does that include the title
search, Mr. Petty?
MR. PETTY: Yes it does, your Honor.
I have
estimated that the time involved in appearance
today would be eight hours, and estimating time~
draw findings of fact and conclusions and an
appearance at the foreclosure sale, if necessary,
would be an additional eight hours, which would be
a total of fifty-three and a half hours, that the
normal billing rate for those hours is forty
dollars per hour, and that is a reasonable fee for
those services, and that the attorney's fee would
be awarded to Prudential should be based on that
hourly figure of forty dollars per hour, which
is a total of two thousand one hundred forty
dollars.
(Tr. pp. 34-5.)
Udell R. Jensen, attorney for Halbert Davis,

testified as to attorney's fees as follows:
That it has been my observation and experience in
mortgage foreclosure while there is security that
the amount of the attorney's fees bears a relationship to the amount of the obligation; that the
obligation amount is graduated from a larger
amount, of above twenty-five thousand dollars,
generally, at ten percent or less, when you get w
the lower amounts like five thousand dollars, that
is involved in this particular case, like five to
six, that the general rate of taxing that is
nearer twenty percent. . . .
So far as the matter
of Prudential Federal Savings & Loan, I would
n
think their fee would be nearer eleven hundred an
twelve hundred would be a reasonable fee to oblr
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
gate debtor to pay.
(Tr. p. 71.)
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Upon cross examination by counsel for Prudential,

Mr. Jensen testified as follows:
Q

Is an hourly attorney's fee a reasonable basis for
charging fees?

A

Consultation for him and his client, I think it
is.

Q

Now, isn't is true, Mr. Jensen, that the foreclosure proceedings that are involved in this
matter as to Babylon Corporation and Bank of
Ephraim and as to Prudential Federal Savings &
Loan Association are substantially the same?

A

You mean the amount of work and effort?

Q

Well I mean that partly and I mean just the nature
of the foreclosure proceeding itself as set forth
by Utah statute and by Utah law; aren't they
substantially

A

They become substantially the same whenever the
defendant commences a cross complaint and becomes
substantially the plaintiff as to his own client.
(Tr., p. 75.)
Counsel for Halbert Davis also testified that fees

based upon the amount of obligations were based upon:
[S]ome publications [that] have come across my
desk in years gone by referred to credation of
secured obligations and unsecured obligations with
respect to percentages that were commonly attributed to payment and the obligation upon the
debtors who had them.
(Tr. p. 72.)

Upon cross examination by counsel for Prudential, Mr. Jensen
testified as follows:

Q

What's the source of these publications that you
refer to?

A

Well, I first became experienced in that in connection with the Federal Land Bank of Berkeley and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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- 8 that's some 25 or 30 years ago, and then became
experienced in connection with those handling
private lenders at Nephi, Utah, and subsequent
to t~at there would be an occasional mortgage
or !~ens to be foreclosed and then in connection
with those matters beginning about six years ago,
I represented the Bank of Ephraim for about th~e
years in connection with this foreclosure.

Q

Who published these publications that you refer
to?

A

I can't give you the i tern.
It's too long ago that
I saw and I can't give that.

Q

So is your testimony based on these publications,
the source of which you can't recall?

A

No, partially upon that and partially upon my
practice and partially on what I have observed
others have done.

Q

Are any of these schedules that you have referred
to based upon a bar schedule?

A

I have seen them at the time until I recently had
some problems as to whether or not they would be
schedule accepted.
I don't remember what the Utah
Bar is and I haven't looked at it in the

Q

You say a question of whether or not the schedules
would be acceptable?

A

The courts, as I understand, have been saying that
we may not have a fixed schedule as members of our
Bar, that we have to have some other standard because of the matter tending to be antitrust or
some other basis.
(Tr., pp. 72-3; emphasis added.)
Louis Tervort, counsel for the Bank of Ephraim,
. f.18 d

upon cross examination by counsel for Prudential, testl
as follows:

Now if Funding
Prudential
Federal Savings & Loan Associa·
Sponsored by the Q
S.J. Quinney Law Library.
for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services, 5 fees
'
tion
to Act,
pay
for by
the
amount
.
Library
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on theMachine-generated
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attorney spent on this case, and further assuming
that that amount of time was somewhere in the
vicinity of 40 hours, would that be a reasonable
fee in your judgment.
A

I don't think that I would take it as a reasonable
fee in this case, no.

Q

Would that be too much?

A

I am not saying in all cases, but I would say it
would not be.

Mr. Tervort also testified that all costs were included in
the fees claimed on behalf of the Bank of Ephraim (Tr. p. 91).
The trial court awarded the Bank of Ephraim attorney's fees in the amount of $4,650, Prudential attorney's
fees in the amount of $900 and costs of $25, and Babylon
Corporation attorney's fees in the amount of $2,000 and
costs of $40 (R. 248-53).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION OF PRIORITIES AS TO
THE CAFE PROPERTY IS CORRECT AND PROPER
The priority of the Bank of Ephraim over Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association is limited to the
amount of $3,000, based upon the provision on the face of
the mortgage as follows:

"This mortgage covers all addi-

tional advances on this loan, the total principal amount not
to exceed $3,000."

By the recording of the mortgage, se-

curing indebtedness in the amount of $2,400, and based on
the language quoted above, a subsequent lender is on notice
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 10 of the amount of indebtedness and the limitation upon secured indebtedness of $3,000, including the initial indebt~ness and subsequent advances.

Section 57-3-2, Utah Code

Annotated 1953, as amended, provides as follows:
Every conveyance, or instrument in writing
affecting real estate, executed, acknowledged
or approved, and certified, in the manner prescribed by this title •
. or a copy thereof,
required by law to be recorded in the office
of the county recorder shall, from the time of
filing the same with the recorder for record,
impart notice to all persons of the contents
thereof; and subsequent purchasers, mortgagees
and lienholders shall be deemed to purchase
and take with notice.
(Emphasis added.)
In Wilson v. Schneiter's Riverside Golf Course,
523 P.2d 1226 (Utah, 1974), this Court referred to Section
57-3-2, U.C.A. 1953.

The Court held that where there was an

overlap in descriptions of property sold to the plaintiff
and defendant by their common seller:
[P]laintiffs having recorded their notice
of purchase prior to the recording of the
defendant's deed, the defendant becomes
the subsequent purchaser and is deemed to
take with notice of the plaintiff's interest.
(Footnote omitted; emphasis added.)
(Inasmuch as the issues involved in this matter relate
entirely to mortgagees, with no issue as to whether the
mortgagees are subject to and entitled to rely upon the
provisions of Section 57-3-2, u.c.A. 1953, the objection of
the dissent in the Wilson case is not presented.)
It is undisputed that the Bank of Ephraim's mort-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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However, the subsequent mortgagees, by virtue

of the Bank of Ephraim having recorded its mortgage, had
notice of the contents of the Bank of Ephraim's mortgage,
and the limitation upon secured indebtedness contained
therein.

The contents of the mortgage indicate that the

mortgage was to secure indebtedness in the amount of $2,400,
with a possible additional advance to an amount of $3,000.
Subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and lienholders could rely
upon the contents of the mortgage in transactions concerning
the property.
The Bank of Ephraim is limited as to subsequent
mortgagees to the limitations provided in its own documents.
The mortgage in favor of the Bank of Ephraim is on the
Bank's printed form, with the limitation language added by
typewriter.

If there is any uncertainty as to the meaning

of the provisions of a contract, it is construed against its
framer.

Seal v. Tayco, Inc., 16 U.2d 323, 400 P.2d 503

(1965); General Mills,

Inc. v. Cragun, 103 Utah 239, 134

p. 2d l 0 8 9 ( 19 4 3) .
This rule, that the limitation contained on the
face of the mortgage gives notice to subsequent lienholders
and is binding on the mortgagee is stated in a case cited by
the Bank of Ephraim in its Brief on Appeal.
~artini,

19 Pac. 641

In Tapia v.

(Cal. 1888), a mortgage on real

Property
secured indebtedness, and by the terms of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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- 12 mortgage the indebtedness could include future advances up
to $15,000.

The Court held the mortgage valid and

prior~

subsequent encumbrances recorded before future advances were
made, such priority up to the amount expressly limited by
the mortgage.

The Supreme Court of California stated the

following:
[T]he mortgage under which the appellant
claims was of record, and was notice to
subsequent encumbrancers that it constituted a lien on the property to the full
sum of $15,000.
They [the materialmen]
performed labor on the property, with
full notice of the existence of a lien
to that amount.
(19 Pac. 643; emphasis
added.)
In claiming priority over the mortgage of Halbert
Davis to Steven Kay Steinmann, the Bank of Ephraim states
that the mortgage to Steinmann expressly states that the
mortgage is secondary to the mortgage of the Bank of Ephraim.
The Bank of Ephraim relies upon the language in the mortgage
to Steven Kay Steinmann, but wants to repudiate the language
in its own mortgage.

References in mortgages that such

mortgage is subject to a prior mortgage or that it is a
second mortgage have been construed consistently with such
provisions, making the mortgage subject to the prior enc~brance.

In Summers v. Hallam Cooley Enterprises, 132 P. 2d

60 (Cal.App. 1942), the Court held that the words "second
mortgage" in a document made the mortgage subordinate to a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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- 13 that her interest should be prior.

See also Anderson v.

Barr, 62 P.2d 1242 (Okla. 1937); Richards v. Lawing, 27 P.2d
730 (Wash.

1934).

The provision of the mortgage of the Bank

of Ephraim, limiting the advances on the loan to $3,000,
should be given effect, which would be consistent with the
rule of the foregoing cases giving meaning to the language
of the recorded documents, which give notice to subsequent
lienholders and encumbrancers.
Rules of construction of documents establish that
the Bank of Ephraim's claims on appeal are without merit.
The first rule of construction applicable here is that the
language of the document must be given its plain and ordinary meaning.
In Bonneville Lumber Co. v. J. G. Peppard Seed Co.,
72 Utah 463,

271 Pac. 226 (1928), the plaintiff sued for

conversion of crops mortgaged by the defendant to secure a
promissory note.

In construing the mortgage, the Court

stated the following:
It is a cardinal rule of construction, and
the first to be applied whenever construction
becomes necessary, that, unless technical
terms are used, the language must be given
its plain, ordinary and obvious meaning.
[State v. Davis, 55 Utah 54, 184 P. 161.]
If that rule is applied to the instant
case, it is unnecessary to make further
comment as to the meaning of the language
in question here.
The plain meaning of the inserted language is that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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- 14 Ephraim contends that the provisions that the mortgage is to
secure all future advances must also be given effect.
However, another rule of construction of documents requires
that "where there is a printed form of a contract, and other
words are inserted, in writing or otherwise, it is to be
assumed that they take precedence over the printed matter."
Holland v. Brown, 15 U. 2d 422, 394 P. 2d 77

(1964).

Thus,

the inserted limitations on indebtedness to $3,000 take
precedence over the printed form language to resolve any
inconsistency.
The Bank of Ephraim has failed to cite any authority which deals with the specific question of the effect of
the $3,000 limitation in the mortgage upon subsequent mortgagees.
lem.

In fact, it does not even address this basic prob-

The only authorities cited by the Bank of Ephraim

bearing even remotely on the issue are several cases in
support of the rule that "advances made under a recorded
mortgage given to secure further optional advances will not
be denied priority in lien merely because the intervening
encumbrancer could not have determined from the mortgage,
without extraneous inquiry, the true amount of the indebtedness of advances secured thereby."

In the present case, no

extraneous inquiry is necessary to determine the advances
made by the Bank of Ephraim to be secured by the mortgage,
because an express limitation appears on the face of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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- 15 Whether the advances to be secured by the mortgage
on the cafe property were optional or whether the Bank of
Ephraim had actual notice of subsequent mortgages is irrelevant in view of the express limitation contained in the
mortgage of the Bank of Ephraim.

(However, whether the

advances were optional is relevant to the priorities on the
trailer court property.

See Point II of this Brief.)

The claim of the Bank of Ephraim must be denied in
view of General Mills, Inc. v. Cragun, 103 Utah 239, 134

P.2d 1089 (1943), which is so similar to the instant case as
~

be controlling.

In General Mills, the first paragraph of

the mortgage contained language that the mortgage is given
"as security for the performance of all obligations of the
mortgagors herein contained or expressed."

The fourth

paragraph stated, in part, that the mortgagors would pay
"all other sums now or hereafter due or owing from the
Mortgagors to the Mortgagee; provided, however, that the
maximum amount, the payment of which is secured hereby, is
$3,750.00."

(Emphasis added.)

After stating rules of

construction, including the rule that an arnbigui ty in a
document is construed against the drawer, particularly a
lender of money, the Court stated its holding:
we are constrained to hold from a consideration of the contract in its entirety,
the contract res and the relation of the
parties to each other, that the parties
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- 16 This case requires that this Court deny the claims that the
Bank of Ephraim has priority on the cafe property over
subsequent mortgagees in excess of the specific limitation
of $3,000.
Similarly, in Western Mortgage L. Corp. v. Cottonwood Const. Co., 18 U.2d 409, 424 P.2d 437

(1967), the

mortgage provided that it was to secure additional loans
made after the date thereof to the owner of the real

estat~,

provided that no additional advancement would be made if it
caused the total indebtedness secured by the mortgage to
exceed the amount of the original indebtedness.

The Utah

Supreme Court held that the amount of the mortgage, including advances in an amount less than the original indebtedness and which were made subsequent to improvements made on
the property, took priority over mechanic's liens filed
against the property resulting from the improvements.

In

applying the Western Mortgage case to the instant case,
where the mortgage of the Bank of Ephraim on its face cnated a limitation as to the amount which could be advanced,
the subsequent mortgage of Prudential takes priority over
any advance in excess of the amount specified in the mortgage to the Bank of Ephraim.
· ·
of the mortgage to the
In summary, the provlslons
Bank of Ephraim must be given effect, and subsequen

t mort-

gagees are entitled to rely upon the provisions thereof in
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- 17 making subsequent loans secured by the property.

The pri-

ority of the Bank of Ephraim is limited by the express
limitation contained in its own mortgage.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED INSOFAR AS THE
BANK OF EPHRAIM WAS AWARDED PRIORITY OVER PRUDENTIAL
IN EXCESS OF $4,000 ON THE TRAILER COURT PROPERTY
BECAUSE THE EXCESS WAS NOT MANDATORY AND WAS
ADVANCED AFTER PRUDENTIAL'S LOAN AND MORTGAGE
On March 15, 1971, the Bank of Ephraim loaned
Halbert T. Davis $4,000, secured by a mortgage in favor of
the Bank of Ephraim on the trailer court property.

There-

after, on June 21, 1972, Prudential made its loan to defendant Davis, which loan was secured by a mortgage on the cafe
and trailer court properties.

This loan was superceded by a

subsequent loan by Prudential to Davis on October 16, 1972.
Finally, on July 31, 1974, the Bank of Ephraim loaned Davis
$1,508.41.

The additional loan of the Bank of Ephraim to

Davis was not mandatory and was advanced two years after its
original loan and Prudential's loan secured by the trailer
court property.
The predominant rule on the issue of priority
where advances are made is that if such advances are optional and not mandatory, then the lien priority for the
advances is determined as of the time the advances are
actually made.

In the present case, the Bank of Ephraim

madeSponsored
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-- 18 two years after Prudential's loan.

The optional advances of

the Bank of Ephraim are subordinate to Prudential's loan

a~

mortgage.
In National Bank of lvashington v. Equity Investors,
506 P.2d 20 (Wash. 1973), a materialman, Columbia Wood
Products, Inc., claimed that the construction loan advances
of National Bank of Hashington and General Mortgage Investment were optional and, thus, subordinate to the advances
made by Columbia Wood Products.

The Supreme Court of Wash-

ington stated the rule as follows:
If [the advances] were optional, then under
the principles adopted by this Court, Columbia
Wood Products' lien for lumber delivered and
utilized in the apartment house project should
be superior to that of the bank's deed of trust
insofar as advances made subsequent to the
materialman's perfected lien are concerned.
If the bank, however, under the construction
loan agreement, could have been compelled in
the course to advance the monies on the
loan, then its lien is totally superior
and prior to that of Columbia Wood Products.
506 P.2d at 27, 28.
In finding that the advances of the lenders were optional,
the Court cited numerous authorities in support of the rules
stated above:
Thus, we are adhering to what we perceive
to be the weight of authority in the rule
that, where the advances of promised loan
monies are, under an agreement to lend the
money, largely optional, that is, where the
time and the amount of the monies to be
advanced are largely discretionary in the
lender, the legal effect of such provisions
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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- 19 is to bring the transaction under the rule
for optional advances rather than the rule
governing mandatory advances for the purpose
of determining lien priorities. Optional
advances under a construction loan agreement,
attach when the advances are actually made.
Any liens attaching prior to an optional
advance would thus be superior to it, and
attaching afterwards, junior to it. Elmendorf-Anthony Co. v. Dunn, 10 Wash.2d ~16
P.2d 253 (1941); Kimmel v. Batty, 168 Colo.
431, 451 P.2d 751 (1969); Peterson v. John J.
Reilly, Inc., 105 N.H. 340, 200 A.2d 21 (1964);
Lyman Land Co. v. Union Bank of Benton, 237
Ark. 629, 374 S.W.2d 820 (1964).
In Kimmel v. Batty, 451 P.2d 751 (Colo. 1969), the
Supreme Court of Colorado stated the following:
It is universally held that where a mortgagee
is obligated to make advances, he will be
protected in his security for the full amount
of such advances whether made before or after
an intervening lien attaches, and in most
jurisdictions it is immaterial whether he
had notice of the intervening lien prior
to making such advancement • . . . First
Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. of RocheSter
v. Green Acres Bldg. Corp., 38 Misc.2d 149,
236 N.Y.S.2d 1009.
In the case last cited,
it was held that under a mortgage to secure
future advances, ' . . • if it is optional with
the mortgagee to make or refuse the advances,
he will be protected by security of his mortgage only as to the advances made before the
attaching of the junior lien or encumbrance.'
We approve this rule.
(Emphasis added.)
Similarly, in Leche v. Ponca City Production Credit
~. 478 P.2d 347

(Okla. 1970), the Supreme Court of

Oklahoma held that where a prior mortgagee was not obligated
for future advances under the real estate mortgage and had
actual knowledge of an obligation on the subsequent mortSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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- 20 encompass debts not included originally and could not claim
priority of its mortgage to secure advances made after the
subsequent mortgage.
The Bank of Ephraim, in its Brief on Appeal,
states at page 9:

"The plaintiff admits at the beginning

that the advances made by the Bank of Ephraim were optional
and not obligatory under the mortgage."

Therefore, the

priority of the Bank of Ephraim as to the trailer park
property over Prudential is limited to the $4,000 advanced
prior to Prudential's installment note and mortgage.

The

advance which the Bank of Ephraim claims is prior to Prudential's installment note and mortgage was made more than
two years after Prudential's loan secured by the mortgage on
the trailer court property.
The Utah case of Utah Savings & Loan Association
v. Mecham, 11 U.2d 159, 356 P.2d 281 (1960), aff'd on rehearing, 12 U.2d 335, 366 P.2d 598 (1961), supports the
foregoing rule and authorities.

In the Mecham case, the

issue was the priority of the mortgagee in relation to
materialmen whose liens attached after the mortgage, but
prior to certain advances made by the mortgagee.

Because

the findings of the trial court were inadequate for deteremanded
mination of the issues presented, the Supreme Cour t r
the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
doing so, the Court said:

In

"Because of the necessity for
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- 21 further proceedings we hereinafter discuss certain principles of law applicable thereto."

Among the principles

discussed is the priority issue based on required advances:
The remaining defendant lien claimants
also argue that they shold be permitted to
retain the priorities awarded them by the
trial court because there was no legally
binding agreement between the Mechams as
mortgagors and the plaintiff as mortgagee
covering the future advances to be made
on the obligations and, therefore, the money
advanced after those lien claimants had commenced delivering the materials to the properties should be treated as separate transactions, inferior to their lien rights.
It
is therefore necessary for the trial court
to determine when the mortgagee became bound
to advance such moneys.
It must be
appreciated that a mortgagee who is loaning
money to a mortgagor-borrower generally is
not only entitled but obligated to pay out
the money in accordance with the directions
of the borrower.
356 P.2d at 284.
(Emphasis
added.)
That future advances were optional is admitted by the Bank
of Ephraim.

Thus, the priority which arises where the

advances are obligatory, Mecham, supra, does not occur in
the case at bar.

Therefore, under the rules and authority

cited above, the priority of the Bank of Ephraim is governed
by the order of its advances in relation to loans of other

mortgagees.
The priority of the Bank of Ephraim on the trailer
court property is limited to $4,000, the amount of its loan
Prior to the loan and mortgage of Prudential.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE AMOUNT OF ITS AWARD
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS TO PRUDENTIAL
The trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Judgment in awarding Prudential attorney's fees in
the amount of $900 and costs in the amount of $25 are inconsistent with other Findings and Conclusions of the Court

a~

inconsistent with the evidence introduced.
The uncontradicted testimony from each of the
attorneys involved at the trial was that a fee based upon
the time spent by the attorney, if charged at a reasonable
rate, was appropriate.

Udell Jensen, attorney for defen&nt

Davis, when asked if an hourly attorney's fee is a reasonable basis for charging fees,

stated "consultation for

and his client, I think it is."

h~

The testimony of Louis

Tervort, counsel for the Bank of Ephraim, and S. Rex Lewis,
counsel for Steven Kay Steinmann and Babylon Corporation,
support an award of attorney's fees based upon the time
spent on the case.

Counsel for Prudential testified that

the time spent to the date of trial was 37-1/2 hours, estimated the appearance at the trial to be eight hours, and a
possible appearance at the foreclosure sale would be an
additional eight hours, for a total of 53-1/2 hours, and
that the normal billing rate for the time is $40 per hour.
Prudential's counsel also testifed as to costs in the amount
ofby the
$167.00.
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Although the attorney for Halbert Davis stated
that a fee based upon an hourly basis is not unreasonable,
his testimony was that if the attorney's fees were based on
the amount involved in the obligation, a fee based on $5,000
indebtedness would be nearly $1,100 and $1,200.
In spite of the foregoing evidence, the trial
court awarded $900 as Prudential's attorney fees and $25
costs.

The installment note and mortgage of Prudential

(Exhibit 6) obligates the defendant Davis to pay a "reasonable attorney fee in addition to other costs and expenses"
upon foreclosure.

The narrow question here is what consti-

tutes a reasonable fee and whether the claim of Prudential
exceeded a reasonable fee.
In FMA Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc., 17
U.2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965), the Supreme Court reversed the
trial court's award of attorney's fees because there was no
evidence on which to base the award.

The Court stated:

It is fundamental that the judgment must be
based upon findings of fact, which in turn
must be based upon the evidence. This rule
has been followed by this Court and other
jurisdictions in regard to awarding attorney's
fees.
Because both judges and lawyers have
special knowledge as to the value.of legal
services, this is not always requ1red to be
proved by sworn testimony.
It is sometimes
submitted upon stipulation: as to the ~ount;
or that the judge may fix it on the bas1s.of
his own knowledge and experience; and/or 1n
connection with reference to a Bar approved
schedule. Any one of these would have proan evidenciary
basis provided
for by
making
the
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- 24 determination.
However, it was an issue
of fact which was denied.
Thus it was a
part of plaintiff's case to which it had
the burden of proving.
Failing to offer
proof of any character on this issue had
the same effect as would the failure to offer
proof as to any other controverted issue.
There is nothing upon which to base a finding.
404 P.2d 673-74.
FMA Financial indicates that attorney's

fees~~~

but need not, be submitted (1) upon stipulation as to the
amount,

(2) upon the parties' stipulation that the judge may

fix a fee based on his knowledge and experience, or (3) with
reference to a Bar-approved schedule.

The attorney's fees

in the instant case were not submitted on any of the foregoing bases, but rather were proved by sworn testimony.
Although the trial court is in an advantaged
position to judge the amount of reasonable attorney's fees,
Wallace v. Build, Inc., 16 U.2d 401, 402 P.2d 699 (1965),
the finding of the Court must nonetheless be based upon the
evidence.

FMA Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc., supra.

The rule of this Court is that attorney's fees are left to
agreement between the attorney and his client, "subject to
the right of the Court to discipline the attorney where the
fee charged is unconscionable, or advantage is taken of t~
ignorance of the client."
207 P. 2d 178 (1949).
U. 2d 263, 488 P. 2d 298

Thatcher v.

Industrial Commis~'

In Rudd v. Crown International, 26
(1971), the Supreme Court affirmed
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- 25 Plaintiff's counsel originally agreed to work for $35 per
hour, but as the action progressed and motions and hearings
multiplied, the fee was raised to $5,000, then to $10,000.
This Court affirmed the award of $10,000, the amount agreed
upon by the attorney and his client, as testified to at the
trial.
In John C. Cutler Association v. De Jay Stores, 3
U.2d 107, 279 P.2d 700 (1955), the plaintiff appealed an
award of $300 attorney's fees.

No evidence was introduced

at the trial concerning the fees, but the parties stipulated
that the trial court could determine the amount to be awarded.
The Court stated :
Under such circumstances, it is permissible
for the trial court, who as a lawyer and
judge has special knowledge and experience
concerning such matters, to take into consideration his own knowledge and to use his
judgment as to the value of such services.
But there being no evidence for us to review,
it is more difficult to appraise the reasonableness of the judgment than if there had been
evidence for comparison with it.
279 P.2d
at 704.
At the trial of the present case, the issue of
attorney's fees was not submitted upon stipulation for
determination by the court, but was rather based on sworn
testimony at the trial.
The award of attorney's fees to counsel for Prudential is inconsistent with the award of attorney's fees to
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- 26 Steinmann and Babylon Corporation v1cre awarded attorney's
fees in the amount of $2,000, whereas Prudential was awarded
$900.

It is clear that the award to Babylon of $2,000 was

based on an hourly basis since counsel for Steinmann and
Babylon testified:

"A strictly hourly basis, I will have,

approximately $2,000."

His testimony was that $50 per hour

was his usual hourly rate.

The testimony of counsel for

Prudential indicated 45-1/2 hours, through the trial, not
including subsequent time for drawing findings of fact,
conclusions of law and appearing at a foreclosure sale.
Counsel for Prudential testified that $40 per hour is a
normal and reasonable fee for the services provided, which
would result in a fee of $1,820.

Findings of fact neces-

sarily contrary to each other should not be permitted to
stand.

Malstrom v. Consolidated Theatres, 4 U. 2d 181, 290

P. 2d 689 (1955).

See West v. West, 16 U.2d 411, 403 P.2d 22

(1965).
The evidence submitted to the Court by each of tne
attorneys, supports the claim of Prudential of a fee based
upon the time spent on the matter.

This Court should

reverse the trial court's awar d an d d]_. rect entry of an award
· 1.
based upon the evidence introduced at trla

The attorney's

fee should be at least $1,820, and costs in the amount of
$167.00.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court's determination of the priorities
as to the cafe property is supported by the evidence introduced at trial, is in accordance with law, and should be
affirmed.

The limitation of $3,000 on the face of the

mortgage must be given effect and act as notice to subsequent mortgagees.
The priority of the Bank of Ephraim over Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association on the trailer court
property must be limited to $4,000.

The Bank's subsequent

advance, made after Prudential's loan and mortgage, was
purely optional and thus subordinate to Prudential's loan.
The trial court's award of attorney's fees and
costs to Prudential was contrary to the evidence and should
be

reversed with instructions to enter an award of at least

$1,820, with costs of $167.00.

Respectfully submitted this 13th day of August,
1976.

MOYLE & DRAPER
By __~~~~-n7.L.~----------
Wayne G. Petty
600 Deseret Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Prudential Federal Savings
Loan Association
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